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COMMENTS 
Punishment for War Crimes: Duty-or Discretion?* 
In 1968, a movie called The Graduate received wide critical ac-
claim for characterizing the malaise of youthful America.1 For many, 
the scene most representative of contemporary irrelevance took place 
during the protagonist's homecoming party, at which a businessman, 
with grave and repetitive insistence, encouraged the recent college 
graduate to enter the plastics industry.2 In a CBS-TV news inter-
view on November 24, 1969, Paul D. Meadlo revealed his participa-
tion in an incident in Vietnam that has captured the horrified 
attention of the nation.3 Meadlo, twenty-three years old, is a machine 
operator in a Terre Haute, Indiana plastics factory.4 
l. BACKGROUND 
The four Geneva Conventions of 19495 form "part of what are 
generally known as the laws and customs of war, breaches of which 
are commonly called 'war crimes.' "6 Essentially, the function of the 
Conventions is to provide for the protection of civilian and military 
victims in the event of an armed conflict between two or more of 
• The author is a West Point graduate and Vietnam veteran who served as Special 
Security Assistant to the United States Commander in Vietnam at the time of the 
My Lai incident and shortly thereafter commanded a unit in the United States Army's 
America! Division, of which the force that attacked My Lai was a part.-Ed. 
I. See, e.g., Alpert, "The Graduate" Makes Out, SATURDAY REv., July 6, 1968, at 14. 
2. " 'Ben, I want to say one word to you, just one word,' a friend of the family 
breathes in his ear ••.• 'Plastics,' the fellow says, imparting the great secret to success 
in our time. 'There is a great future in plastics.'" Id. at 15. 
3. N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1969, § 1, at I, col. 2. See also notes 17, 18, 22 &: 176 infra 
and accompanying text. Prior to Meadlo's disclosure, public and media reaction to 
allegations of a massacre of Vietnamese civilians by American troops had been 
routinely unremarkable. The indictment of Army First Lieutenant "William L. Calley, 
Jr., for the murder of 109 unarmed South Vietnamese civilians was reported on page 
fourteen in the N.Y. Times. N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1969, § I, at 14, col. 3. 
4. N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1971, at I, col. I. 
5. The four conventions were adopted by the 1949 Diplomatic Conference at 
Geneva, Switzerland. These Conventions are the Geneva Convention for the Ameliora-
tion of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, [1955] 3 
U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Field Convention]; the 
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and 
Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, [1955] 3 U.S.T. 3217, 
T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T .S. 85 [hereinafter Sea Convention); the Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, [1955] 3 U.S.T. 3316, 
T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter POW Convention]; the Geneva Conven-
tion Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 
[1955] 3 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Civilian Conven-
tion]. 
6. 1 J. PICI'E"I', Cm,rMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF AUGUST 12, 1949, at 
351 (1952) [hereinafter PICI'E"I' COMMENTARY]. 
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the High Contracting Parties (Parties).7 Minimum standards are 
also established for the conduct of a Party during an "armed con-
flict not of an international character" within its territory.8 The first 
significant international attempt to protect war victims occurred in 
1785 when the United States and Prussia concluded a Treaty of 
Amity and Commerce,9 which laid down rules for the protection 
of the wounded and prisoners similar to those later established by 
the 1949 Conventions.10 Subsequent to this initial attempt, a series 
of similar international conventions have been adopted in an effort 
to mitigate the consequences of armed conflict.11 A consistently 
critical element in the formulation, adoption, and operation of such 
conventions has been the problem of dealing with breaches by a 
Party of the standards of conduct established. This problem received 
increasing attention with each new effort to codify the rules of war.12 
Immediately prior to the adoption of the 1949 Conventions, it was 
remarked in reference to one of these earlier conventions that "[i]t 
is one of the greatest weaknesses of the existing rules on prisoners 
7. Art. 2 of each Convention provides in part: 
[T]he present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other 
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the ••• Parties, even if 
the state of war is not recognized by one of them. 
8. Art. 3 of each Convention provides in part: 
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the 
territory of one of the .•• Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to 
apply, as a minimum, the following provisions: 
(I) ••• r1f umane, nondiscriminatory treatment of protected persons, including 
prohibition of]: 
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, 
mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture • . • . 
9. Sept. 10, 1785, 8 Stat. 84 (1785), T .S. No. 292. 
10. H. COURSIER, COURSE OF FIVE LESSONS ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS 6 (1963). 
11. 1 PICTET Cor.™ENTARY, supra note 6, at 352-60. The first of these efforts, the 
Convention for the Relief of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field, Aug. 22, 
1864, 22 Stat. 940 (1864), T .S. No. 377 [hereinafter 1864 Convention], was concluded in 
Geneva in 1864 under the auspices of the newly organized International Committee 
of the Red Cross [hereinafter Red Cross]. See generally J. JOYCE, THE RED CROSS 
INTERNATIONAL AND THE STRATEGY OF PEACE (1959). The 1864 Convention was revised 
twice prior to 1949. July 6, 1906, 35 Stat. 1885 (1906), T.S. No. 464 [hereinafter 1906 
Convention]; July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2074 (1929), T.S. No. 847. In addition, a Convention 
dealing solely with prisoners of war was adopted in Geneva in 1929. July 27, 1929, 47 
Stat. 2021 (1929), T .S. No. 846 [hereinafter 1929 POW Convention]. Of equal importance 
in this series was the Hague Convention of 1907, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2371 (1907), T.S. 
No. 543, which included an Annex Respecting the Laws and Customs of ·war on Land, 
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 (1907), T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter Hague Regulations]. 
12. The delegates to the 1864 Convention, supra note 11, rejected a clause requiring 
punishment of violators. Despite support from the Institute of International Law and 
the President of the Red Cross to require each party to enact penal legislation for 
Convention breaches, the 1906 revision provided for "repression" of only two violations: 
acts of robbery and ill treatment of military sick and wounded. 1906 Convention, supra 
note 11, art. 28. The 1929 POW' Convention provided broader sanctions, but did not 
require that all breaches be punished. 1929 POW Convention, supra note 11, art. 29. 
The Hague Regulations contained a provision similar to art. 28 of the 1906 Convention, 
but it again contained no obligation to promulgate penal ordinances. Hague Regula-
tions, supra note 11, art. 21. See I PICTET COMMENTARY, supra note 6, at 352-57. 
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of war that they do not contain definite and written provisions on 
sanctions."13 In view of such criticisms and the ad hoc measures 
taken to deal with the war crimes of World War II,14 negotiators 
in 1949 agreed that specific provisions for punishment of breaches 
of the new Conventions were essential.15 Accordingly, each of the 
Four Conventions adopted in 1949 contained an article requiring 
each Party to "enact any legislation necessary to provide effective 
penal sanctions for persons committing . . . grave breaches" of the 
Conventions.16 
On March 16, 1968, the most notorious American atrocity yet 
documented in the Vietnam war took place in the Vietnamese prov-
ince of Quang Ngai.17 Soldiers of the United States Army's America! 
Division participated in an operation in which scores of unarmed 
South Vietnamese civilians were slain.18 If the 1949 Conventions are 
13. INST. OF WORLD POLITY, PRISONERS OF WAR 89 (1948) (referring to 1929 POW 
Convention, supra note 11). 
14. See TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS (U.S. 
Govt. Printing Office ed. 1946-1949). See also note 119 infra. Cf. Horowitz, The Tokyo 
Trial, in INTL. CONCILIATION 475 (1950). 
15. 1 PICTET COMMENTARY, supra note 6, at 359. 
16. Field Convention art. 49; Sea Convention art. 50; POW Convention art. 129; 
Civilian Convention art. 146 provide: 
The . • . Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective 
penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the 
grave breaches of the present Convention defined in the following Article. 
Each .•. Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have 
committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaclies, and shall 
bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It may 
also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of its own legislation, 
hand such persons over for trial to another • • • Party concerned, provided such 
••• Party has made out a prima facie case. 
Each • • • Party shall take measures necessary for the suppression of all acts 
contrary to the provisions of the present Convention other than grave breaches 
defined in the following Article. 
In all circumstances, the accused persons shall benefit by safeguards of proper 
trial and defense, which shall not be less favourable than those provided by 
Article 105 and those following of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treat-
ment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949. 
Grave breaches are defined in each Convention as essentially 
those involving any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property 
protected by the Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, 
including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury 
to body or health, and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not 
justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly. 
Field Convention art. 50. See also Sea Convention art. 51; POW Convention art. 1!10; 
Civilian Convention art. 147. It has been noted that these grave breaclies are reminis-
cent of the Crimes against Humanity set out in the Niirnberg Charter, discussed in 
note 119 infra. Garcia-Mora, Crimes Against Humanity and the Principle of Nonextra-
dition of Political Offenders, 62 MICH. L. REv. 927, 956 (1964). 
17. The notoriety of the incident is illustrated by the fact that the trial of Lieutenant 
Calley was the most publicized trial in modem military history. N.Y. Times, March 30, 
1971, § 1, at 12, col. 3. 
18. See, e.g., Hersh, My Lai 4: A Report on the Massacre and Its Aftermath, 
HARPERS, May 1970, at 53. 
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applicable in the Vietnam War and to the civilian victims at My Lai,19 
the massacre undoubtedly was a grave breach of the standards of 
wartime conduct imposed on the Parties by the Conventions.20 Thus, 
the United States, as a Party to the Conventions,21 would be obligated 
to act in compliance ·with the penal-sanctions provision of the appli-
cable Convention or Conventions. Acting consistently with the 
possible existence of such an obligation, the United States brought 
to trial, and convicted of murder, Army First Lieutenant William L. 
Calley, Jr., Paul Meadlo's platoon leader.22 Because of his disclosures 
on national television, Meadlo, by then discharged from the Army, 
was subpoenaed as a witness for the prosecution.23 Meadlo, however, 
invoked his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and 
refused to testify.24 Although granted a writ of immunity from 
military prosecution by the Commanding General of Fort Benning, 
Georgia, where the trial by court-martial of Lieutenant Calley was 
conducted, Meadlo consistently refused to testify until the Govern-
ment issued a federal immunity order protecting him from civilian 
prosecution.25 Finally, under threat of arrest for further refusal to 
testify after having been granted federal immunity, Meadlo took 
the witness stand on January 11, 1971.26 Ten days later, Assistant 
United States Attorney General William H. Rehnquist struck a 
disquieting note that has been overlooked in the wake of the Calley 
conviction: Has the United States violated its treaty obligation under 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions to prosecute those persons accused of 
"grave breaches" of the Conventions by granting immunity to a 
confessed participant in the My Lai slayings?27 
19. See notes 28-49 infra and accompanying text. 
20. See note 16 supra. 
21. 213 U.N.T .S. 378-84 (1955). 
22. See note 3 supra. Lieutenant Calley was charged with the premeditated murder 
of 102 civilians in violation of art. 118, Uniform Code of Military Justice, IO U.S.C. 
§ 918 (1964), as amended (Supp. V, 1965-1969) (hereinafter UCMTI. N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 
1970, § 1, at 17, col. I. Lieutenant Calley was found guilty of premeditated murder and 
sentenced to life imprisonment. N.Y. Times, March 30, 1971, § I, at I, col. 8; id., April 
1, 1971, § I, at 1, col. 8. 
23. N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1970, at 5, col. 3. 
24. N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1970, at 12, col. 3. 
25. N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1970, § I, at 4, col. 7. The federal writ of immunity was 
issued under the authority of the Organized Crime Control Act, Act of Oct. 15, 1970, 
Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 926. 
26. N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1971, at 1, col. I. Under § 6002 of the Organized Crime 
Control Act, Act. of Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. II, § 20l(a), 84 Stat. 927, "the 
witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against 
self-incrimination; but no testimony •.• compelled under the order , •• may be used 
against the witness in any criminal case." 
27. Statement of William H. Rehnquist, Wall St. J., Jan. 21, 1971, at I, col. 3. 
Rehnquist stated that the inlmunity order may have constituted a violation of the 
Conventions. But see his later remarks and those of the United States Department of 
State, discussed in note 178 infra. 
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II. THRESHOLD ISSUES 
A. Application of the Conventions 
Before comparing the action of the United States in granting 
immunity with the nature and extent of its obligations under the 
Conventions, it must first be determined whether the Conventions 
apply to the Vietnam War and, if so, precisely what obligations 
within those Conventions are engaged. 
For the Conventions to apply generally, "armed conflict" as re-
quired by the Conventions must be found to exist.28 The Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross (Red Cross) has customarily 
assumed the duty of policing the application of the Conventions.20 
In 1965 the Red Cross communicated to the major participants in 
the Vietnam War its belief that "armed conflict," within the mean-
ing of the Geneva Conventions, existed in South Vietnam.30 The 
Government of the United States has indicated its agreement with 
that assessment.31 Therefore, the Conventions are applicable to the 
American involvement in Vietnam, regardless of the positions taken 
by other belligerents. 32 
Although the United States has agreed that an "armed conflict" 
within the purview of the Conventions exists, this admission alone 
does not define the applicable standard of conduct. The Conventions 
28. See all four Conventions, arts. 2 &: 3. 
29. Pictet, The New Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims, 45 
AM. J. !NTL. L. 462 (1951). The special position of the Red Cross, a private organization 
of Swiss nationals, is specifically recognized in the Conventions. See, e.g., POW Con-
vention art. 9. See generally !NTL. COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, HANDBOOK OF THE INTER-
NATIONAL RED CROSS (10th ed. 1953). Its opinions enjoy great respect because of its 
"rigid observance of neutrality and impartiality in performing its exclusively humani-
tarian services." Note, The Geneva Conventions of 1949: Application in the Vietnamese 
Conflict, 5 VA. J. INTL. L. 243, 262 n.117 (1965). 
30. Letter from the Red Cross to the United States, the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam [hereinafter North Vietnam], the Republic of Vietnam [hereinafter South 
Vietnam], and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam [hereinafter NLF], 
June 11, 1965, in 5 INTL. REv. OF THE RED CROSS 417 (1965). 
31. "[T]he United States Government is applying the provisions of the Geneva 
Conventions and we expect other parties to the conflict to do likewise." Letter from 
Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, to Samuel Gonard, President of the Red Cross, Aug. 10, 
1965, in 4 !NTL. LEGAL l\,lATERIALS 1173 (1965). 
32. Art. 1 of each Convention, which requires each Party "to respect and to 
ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances,'' makes clear that the 
obligations are unilateral, not reciprocal in nature, and that their binding force is not 
limited to the extent that other Parties observe them. G. DRAPER, THE RED CROSS 
CONVENTIONS 7-8 (1958). See also notes 184 &: 185 infra and accompanying text. All of the 
major belligerents, with the exception of the NLF, have ratified the Conventions: 
North Vietnam, 274 U.N.T.S. 335-42 (1957); South Vietnam, 181 U.N.T.S. 349-52 
(1953); the United States, supra note 21. However, North Vietnam indicated to the 
Red Cross its refusal to apply the POW Convention to captured American pilots, and 
its intention to treat them as war criminals. See letter from Bui Tan Linh, Acting 
Head of the North Vietnamese Cabinet, to the Red Cross, Aug. 31, 1965, in 5 INTL. R.Ev. 
OF TW: RED CROSS 527-28 (1965). See also 9 INTL. R.Ev. OF THE RED CROSS 343 (1969). 
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establish standards for two types of armed conflict: conflict between 
two or more of the Parties, or international conflict;33 and conflict 
not of an international character.34 In the case of an international 
conflict, article two of each Convention makes clear that compliance 
with all of the obligations created by the Convention is incumbent 
upon the Parties involved in the conflict.35 Thus, if the conflict is an 
international one, the penal-sanctions article common to all the 
Conventions requires that the Parties punish those responsible for 
"grave breaches."36 However, should the armed conflict not be of 
an international nature, article three of each Convention binds the 
Parties only to the minimum standards of conduct established by 
article three itself.37 In a noninternational conflict, therefore, there 
is no treaty obligation to prosecute persons accused of violating such 
minimum standards since not all Convention provisions are en-
gaged.38 Here again the United States has resolved the problem by 
committing itself to the position that the Vietnam conflict is inter-
national in character.39 By taking such a position, the United States 
has bound itself to comply with all of the Conventions' provisions, 
including the penal-sanctions articles. 
It must next be determined whether the Geneva Conventions 
apply to the My Lai incident specifically. Because the Field Conven-
tion and Sea Convention purport to protect only members of the 
armed forces of a Party, 40 an American violation of the Conventions 
resulting from the murder of South Vietnamese civilians could be 
found to exist only under the POW Convention or the Civilian 
Convention. The latter Conventions proscribe the willful killing of 
persons protected by their provisions.41 The Civilian Convention 
33. See note 7 supra. 
3-1. See note 8 supra. The precise scope of a noninternational conflict for purposes 
of art. 3 was left undefined in the Conventions, although the article was the most 
debated of all the provisions considered by the Geneva delegates. Yingling & Ginnane, 
The Geneva Conventions of 1919, 46 AM. J. INTL. L. 393, 395 (1952). 
35. See note 7 supra. 
36. See note 16 supra. 
37. See note 8 supra. 
38. Art. 3 of each Convention provides in part: "The Parties to the conflict should 
further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of 
the other provisions of the present Convention." Thus, absent the requisite special 
agreements, Parties to such a conflict are bound only to the requirements of art. 3, 
which contains no provision for the punishment of persons who violate its terms. 
39. United States Military Advisory Command, Vietnam (USMACV) Directive No. 
20-5, § 5b, Sept. 21, 1966, as amended, Dec. 16, 1966, in M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF 
INT.ERNATIONAL LAw 216 (1968) ("The United States considers the armed conflict 
presently existing in Vietnam to be international in character. Accordingly, all articles 
of all four Geneva Conventions are applicable.'). 
40. This application is made clear by the titles of the Field and Sea Conventions. 
See note 5 supra. 
41. POW Convention arts. 13 & 130 cover "prisoners of war.'' Civilian Convention 
arts. 32 &: 137 extend to "protected persons," described in art. 4 as "those who, at any 
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appears to be inapplicable because its terms provide that "nationals 
of a co-belligerent State, shall not be regarded as protected persons 
while the State of which they are nationals has normal diplomatic 
representation in the State in whose hands they are."42 Since the 
South Vietnamese civilians killed at My Lai were in the "hands" of 
American soldiers, whose government maintained normal diplo-
matic relations with South Vietnam, these civilians were not pro-
tected under this Convention. Consequently, only the POW 
Convention remains as a possible source of protection for such 
civilians. 
The protective provisions of the POW Convention embrace those 
persons who openly "take up arms to resist the invading forces."43 
In the event that such persons are captured by the invading forces, 
the POW Convention requires that, should there be any question 
whether such persons are resisting the invading forces and are thus 
entitled to the Convention's protections, those protections shall 
apply until such time as a competent tribunal determines the status 
question.44 Although it is not clear that the civilians at My Lai had 
taken up arms to resist Lieutenant Calley's platoon, nevertheless it 
appears that the requisite uncertainty existed in the minds of the 
members of the invading force. Many members of Lieutenant Cal-
ley's unit suspected that some of the My Lai inhabitants they en-
countered were Viet Cong.45 The degree of their uncertainty is 
illustrated by Meadlo's statement that he shot babies in their 
mothers' arms for fear the babies might be carrying concealed 
grenades.46 The applicability of the POW Convention to the My Lai 
civilians becomes even clearer in light of the fact that ambiguities 
in the Conventions should be resolved in favor of the widest possible 
coverage, consistent with the special humanitarian purpose of the 
Conventions and the need for flexibility in development customarily 
attributed to the laws of warfare.47 
If any further authority is needed for the proposition of the 
Convention's applicability to My Lai, it is supplied by the United 
States Army itself. The Army has stated the United States is obligated 
to prosecute Lieutenant Calley and others for their actions in the 
given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or 
occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they 
are not nationals." 
42. Civilian Convention art. 4. 
43. POW Convention art. 4(a)(6). 
44. POW Convention art. 5. 
45. Hersh, supra note 18, at 64. 
46. N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1971, at 4, col. 3. Calley has also revealed his suspicion of 
even the youngest children of My Lai. N.Y. Times, March 30, 1971, at 12, col. 5. 
47. See, e.g., Note, The Geneva Convention and the Treatment of Prisoners of War 
in Vietnam, 80 HARv. L. REv. 851, 854-55 (1967). 
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My Lai incident.48 Left unanswered was the question whether the 
granting of immunity to Meadlo, who has admitted his participation 
in the My Lai slayings,49 was consistent with the Convention's 
obligation to prosecute those alleged to have committed grave 
breaches. 
B. The Direct and Supportive Obligations 
Under the Geneva Conventions a dual system of responsibilities 
exists for the Parties because two different types of obligations are 
created. One type establishes rules to govern the conduct of Parties 
with respect to war victims.60 These provisions, which directly 
regulate the treatment of persons protected by the particular Con-
vention, may be described as "direct" obligations. Such direct 
obligations can apply to the actions of both Parties and individuals 
and can be breached by either, although a breach by an individual 
does not constitute a violation of a Party's treaty obligations unless 
the Party directed the individual's breach. Obligations of the second 
type apply only to the Parties and not to individuals. These obliga-
tions do not regulate the treatment of protected war victims directly, 
but rather require Parties to act in such a way as to ensure observance 
of the direct obligations by individuals. Such obligations may be 
described as "supportive." 
The two most important supportive obligations common to each 
Convention are the requirements to disseminate the text thereof as 
widely as possible among the citizens of each Party, especially among 
the ranks of the Party's armed forces,51 and to punish those who 
commit grave breaches. This second supportive obligation is the 
essence of the penal-sanctions article. That article embodies three 
subsidiary requirements: (I) to enact any needed legislation to 
provide effective punishment for grave breaches; (2) to search for 
any person, regardless of nationality, who may have committed grave 
breaches; and (3) to try under stipulated procedural safeguards, or to 
extradite for trial, any person, regardless of nationality, who may 
have committed grave breaches.112 It appears clear that the extensive 
48. The statement appeared in a four-page "White Paper" issued to every U.S. 
Army unit. N.Y. Times, April 3, 1971, at 1, col. 6 [hereinafter White Paper]. Implicit 
in the Army's statement is the conclusion that the My Lai slayings constituted "wilful 
murder," a grave breach under each of the Conventions. See note 16 supra. 
49. See note 3 supra. 
50. The most important of these rules are common to each of the Conventions. For 
example, each Convention requires the persons it protects to be treated humanely. 
Field Convention art. 12; Sea Convention art. 12; POW Convention art. 13; Civilian 
Convention arts. Zl &: 32. In addition, each proscribes the most egregious forms of 
conduct toward war victims as grave breaches. See note 16 supra. 
51. Field Convention art. 47; Sea Convention art. 48; POW Convention art. 127; 
Civilian Convention art. 144. • 
52. See note 16 supra. 
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investigations conducted by the United States have fulfilled the 
supportive obligation to search for those who committed grave 
breaches in the My Lai incident.53 Whether the United States has 
complied with the other requirements of the penal-sanctions pro-
vision presents issues more difficult to resolve. 
Prosecution of Convention offenders presumes that the Parties 
will establish jurisdictional power over those individuals. In this 
respect, it is not clear whether the United States has complied with 
its obligation "to enact any needed legislation" if it has not created 
jurisdiction over alleged offenders otherwise within its power. Spe-
cifically, an inability to bring ex-servicemen to trial would constitute 
a violation of this obligation.54 During consideration of the 1949 
Conventions by the United States Senate, most legal authorities 
expressed the view that, given the existing American legislation and 
case law concerning the prosecution of war criminals, the United 
States had little, if any, need to enact additional legislation to comply 
with the requirement of the penal-sanctions article.55 However, de-
spite the fact that the Parties to the new Conventions were considered 
to have a greater obligation to enact necessary legislation than under 
previous accords, 66 the minimal additional legislation then consid-
ered necessary was not adopted by the United States.57 Furthermore, 
53. See notes 165 & 176 infra. 
54. It is the "very tentative opinion" of an Assistant U.S. Attorney General that 
the possible inability of the United States to bring its ex-servicemen to trial might 
constitute a technical violation of the Conventions. Letter from William H. Rehnquist 
to the Michigan Law Review, Feb. 4, 1971, on file with the Michigan Law Review 
[hereinafter Rehnquist Letter]; accord, letter from Stanley N. Futterman, Assistant Legal 
Adviser for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State, to the Michigan Law 
Review, Feb. 18, 1971, on file with the Michigan Law Review [hereinafter Futterman 
Letter]. See also Note, Jurisdictional Problems Related to the Prosecution of Former 
Servicemen for Violations of the Law of War, 56 VA. L. R.Ev. 947, 950 (1970). 
55. The Department of Justice stated to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee that a review of existing legislation revealed little need for 
further enactments to provide effective penal sanctions for grave breaches. Hearings on 
Executives D, E, F and G Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 84th Cong., 
1st Sess. 58 (1955) [hereinafter 1955 Senate Hearings]. See also Yingling &: Ginnane, 
supra note 34, at 425-26. It was intended that the Conventions be self-executing through 
existing United States legislation that punished violations of the laws and customs of 
war. The UCMJ, arts. 1-140, enacted in 1950, IO U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1964), as amended 
(Supp. V, 1965-1969), was thought to cover current and certain former members of the 
United States Armed Forces. Case law such as Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. I (1942), and 
ln re Yamashita, 327 U.S. I (1946), which upheld the conviction of enemy aliens tried 
under the jurisdiction of United States military tribunals, was regarded as sufficient to 
deal with nonnationals; and some American civilians were then subject to military 
tribunal jurisdiction under Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952). The Justice De-
partment felt, however, that some additional legislation would be necessary to cover 
those civilians not subject to any of the above-mentioned provisions or existing 
criminal statutes. 
56. I PICI'ET COMMENTARY, supra note 6, at 363. 
57. Compare the absence of any coherent legislative approach by the United States 
to exercise its jurisdiction over violators of the Conventions, or of the laws and customs 
of war generally, with the approach of Great Britain, which has exercised jurisdiction 
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subsequent to the ratification of the Conventions, court-martial 
jurisdiction over alleged war criminals has been narrowed drastically 
by such decisions as United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles58-which 
declared assertions of military jurisdiction over discharged service-
men unconstitutional-and O'Callahan v. Parker59-which limited 
court-martial jurisdiction to service-connected crimes. 
In order, then, to prosecute American civilians accused of grave 
breaches of the Conventions, some authority other than the court-
martial jurisdiction must be found.60 Presently two other sources of 
jurisdiction remain available to American prosecutors. The first 
source consists of existing state and federal criminal statutes whose 
operation is limited to crimes committed within United States 
territory.61 The second source of jurisdiction is the military com-
mission, a court instituted to ensure trial of war crimes not covered 
by court-martial jurisdiction.62 Although serious constitutional ques-
tions have been raised concerning the validity of a military 
commission's jurisdiction over former servicemen, to date such 
jurisdiction has been regarded as proper.63 Numerous proposals have 
also been made for Congress to confer authority on the federal 
irrespective of nationality in its Geneva Conventions Act, 5 &: 6 Eliz. 2, c. 52 (195'7). See 
G. DRAPER, supra note 32, at 119. See also India's Geneva Conventions Act No. 6 of 1960, 
7 All India Rep. Manual (2d ed. 1960); Ramundo, Soviet Criminal Legislation in 
Implementation of the Hague and Geneva Conventions Relating to the Rules of Land 
Warfare, 57 A:M. J. INTL. L. 73 (1963). 
58. 350 U.S. 11 (1955). 
59. 395 U.S. 258 (1969). See Note, Military Law-Military Jurisdiction over Crimes 
Committed by Military Personnel Outside the United States: The Effect of O'Callahan 
v. Parker, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1016 (1970). 
60. For a discussion of a constructive status theory by which the military can exer-
cise court-martial jurisdiction over persons not technically military servicemen, and an 
implied consent theory by which the military can retain jurisdiction over servicemen 
who remain in the service beyond their obligation, see, e.g., Note, Military Law-
Jurisdiction-Serviceman's Implied Consent to Military Status after Enlistment Term 
Expired Held Sufficient for Continuing Military Jurisdiction-United States v. Holt, 46 
N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 384 (1971). 
61. See, e.g., United States v. Assia, 18 F. 915 (2d Cir. 1902). But see, e.g., the 
Neutrality Act of 1917, 18 U.S.C. § 960 (1964), which makes criminal any military enter-
prise to be carried on from the United States against any foreign state with which 
the United States is at peace. 
62. Art. 21, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 821 (1964), as amended (Supp. V, 1965-1969). This 
provision was enacted pursuant to Congress' power to define and punish offenses against 
the law of nations. U.S. CoNsr. art. 1, § 8, cl. 10. Accordingly, the commission can 
exercise jurisdiction over offenses against the common law of war, whereas the court-
martial is limited to jurisdiction over statutory offenses, as presently enumerated in 
the UCMJ. See Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (I Wall) 243, 249 (1863). See generally 
C. HOWLAND, DIGEST OF OPINIONS OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATES GENERAL OF 11IE .ARMY 
1066-67 (1912). 
63. See Rubin, Legal Aspects of the My Lai Incident, 49 ORE. L. REv. 260, 269-70 
(1970); Note, supra note 54, at 964. A commission to try discharged servicemen for 
alleged war crimes in Vietnam has been suggested on several occasions. See, e.g., 
N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1971, at 7, col. l; id,, Nov. 30, 1969, ~ li ilt 29, col. 1. 
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courts to tty ex-servicemen for illegal acts allegedly committed while 
in the service. 64 It has been suggested that proposed jurisdiction of 
this genre could be granted and exercised to prosecute an individual 
such as Meadlo.65 Thus, there appears to be a constitutional basis 
for prosecuting ex-servicemen under existing or proposed legisla-
tion for violation of the Geneva Conventions.66 
Because it has been demonstrated that the United States has 
complied with two requirements imposed upon it by the penal-
sanctions article of the POW Convention by seeking out violators 
and providing a means to deal with such persons, consideration can 
now be given to the question of the United States' compliance with 
the third requirement of that article. The United States is required 
by the terms of the article to "bring such persons ... before its mm 
courts . . . . [or] in accordance with . . . its own legislation, hand 
such persons over for trial to another ... Party," while ensuring the 
accused persons the "safeguards of proper trial and defense."67 The 
obligation to "hand over," or extradite, an accused person is of un-
certain force,68 and is the less compelling of the two methods of 
handling grave breaches. The more likely alternative is that a Party 
would bring those accused of grave breaches "before its own courts." 
The United States has foreclosed this alternative by granting im-
munity to an individual who participated in the My Lai slayings. 
Has this exercise of prosecutorial discretion violated the obligation 
of the Conventions to prosecute war criminals? 
III. PRosEcUT0RIAL DISCRETION AND THE OBLIGATION To PUNISH 
A. Interpretation 
The article establishing the supportive obligation to impose penal 
sanctions for infractions of the Conventions is new and vital: "On 
64. S. 3188-89, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); S. 761, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); S. 
2791, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956). See also Note, Jurisdiction over Ex-Servicemen for 
Crimes Committed Abroad: The Gap in the Law, 22 CASE W. R.Es. L. REv. 279, 296-301 
(1971). 
65. See Note, supra note 54, at 965-67, which concludes that conferring jurisdiction 
on federal courts would be valid if jurisdiction of the military commission were 
originally valid. 
66. But see Note, supra note 64, at 302, which concludes there is presently no 
forum to try ex-servicemen for My Lai offenses. The analysis, however, limited itself 
to court-martial jurisdiction and did not address jurisdiction of the military commis-
sion. Id. at 281. 
67. See note 16 supra. 
68. See, e.g., Garcia-Mora, supra note 16, at 955-59, which demonstrates that extra-
dition is a matter of discretion, dependent upon the law and practice of each Party. 
For a discussion of loopholes in the United States extradition statutes, 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 3181-95 (1964), as amended (Supp. V, 1965-1969), which would permit an alien ac-
cused of grave breaches to fall between the interstices of United States and foreign 
jurisdiction, see Levie, Penal Sanctions for Maltreatment of Prisoners of War, S6 AM.. J• 
!NTL. L. 433, 456-57 (1964). 
June 1971] Comments 1323 
[it] hinges, in large measure, success or failure of the Conventions."69 
This view, and the historical concern for mandatory punishment of 
violators of the laws of war,70 illustrate the importance of determin-
ing whether the obligation to prosecute embraces all alleged war 
criminals. Should it be found that the obligation is absolute, the 
United States will have violated the Conventions by immunizing 
Meadlo from prosecution.71 The scope of the requirement, and the 
answer to whether the United States has complied with its treaty 
obligation, can be determined through interpretation of the penal-
sanctions provision of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
The process of treaty interpretation necessarily involves the selec-
tion of an interpretive method from a body of complex and occa-
sionally conflicting principles.72 Although many of the interpretive 
principles espoused by commentators and employed by decision-
makers often overlap and are commonly employed in conjunction 
with one another, two basic theories predominate: the "objective" 
and "subjective" theories.73 The recently concluded Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention),74 although not 
yet in force,75 embodies the principles of the "objective" theory. 
This theory establishes a hierarchy of interpretive factors that must 
be considered in a fixed order of priority, the sequence of considera-
tion to end as soon as the objective meaning of the term or terms 
69. G. DRAPER, supra note 32, at 20. 
70. See notes 12-16 supra and accompanying text. 
71. The consequences of the grant of immunity are particularly dramatic inas-
much as Meadlo was reported to be the chief accomplice of Lieutenant Calley in 
the mass shootings at My Lai. N.Y. Times, March 30, 1971, at 12, col. 5. 
72. See Proceedings of the American Soc. of Intl. Law, Treaty Interpretation: The 
Proper Role of an International Tribune, 63 AM. Soc. INTL. L. 107, ll5 (1969) [here-
inafter Proceedings]. 
73. See, e.g., Jacobs, Varieties of Approach to Treaty Interpretation: With Special 
Reference to the Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties Before the Vienna Diplo-
matic Conference, 18 INTL. &: CoMP. L.Q. 318 (1969). Although three principles are pre-
sented-the subjective (actual intent of the parties), textual (ordinary meaning of the 
words of the treaty), and teleological (interpretation in light of the treaty's object 
and purpose)-the teleological is considered a combination of the other two. Id. at 
319. For purposes of simplicity, "objective" and "subjective" will be used in this Com-
ment to designate the theories. 
74. U.N. Doc. A/CN. 39/27 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The Vienna 
Convention is the product of the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, 
which met twice in Vienna, Austria. At the second conference, IIO nations (including 
the United States) were represented. U.N. Doc. A/CN. 39/26, at 2 (1969). The text of 
the Convention may be found at Official Documents: Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties, 63 AM. J. INTL. L. 875 (1969). 
75. Vienna Convention arts. 82 &: 84 provide that it will come into force thirty 
days after the deposit of the thirty-fifth instrument of ratification with the United 
Nations Secretary-General. As of December 31, 1969, only Nigeria had deposited a 
ratification. MULTI-LATERAL TREATIES IN Rl:sPECT OF WHICH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL 
PERFORMS DEPOSITARY FUNCrIONS, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER. D./3, at 371-72 (1970). The 
United States is not a signatory. Id. 
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under inquiry becomes evident.76 The "subjective" theory, on the 
other hand, includes all relevant factors in an attempt to ascertain 
the intent of the parties.77 A leading proponent of the subjective 
theory is the United States, where the theory is used in both federal 
and state courts.78 Since the two theories can produce markedly 
different results when applied to the resolution of a treaty dispute, 
the initial choice of theory may prove to be determinative of the 
controversy. The choice of theory may in tum be dictated by the 
nature of the resolution process. In construing the obligation of the 
penal-sanctions provision, it must be realized that "only participant 
States are qualified, through consultation between themselves, to 
give an official and, as it were, authentic interpretation of an inter-
governmental treaty."79 Thus, should objection to the granting of 
immunity be made by another Party to the Conventions, resolution 
of the controversy would hinge on the outcome of the interpretive 
dispute between the two Parties. Because the Geneva Conventions 
do not establish an independent organization to make binding inter-
pretations of their terms, it is doubtful that any such conflict would 
be settled before a formal tribunal unless the disputing Parties 
agreed to submit the problem to the International Court of Justice.80 
76. Vienna Convention art. 31 begins the analytical process with the ordinary mean-
ing of the treaty terms in their context and in light of the treaty's object and purpose. 
Only if this step leads to an ambiguous or absurd result may one resort to the 
supplementary evaluative factors listed in art. 32. Such factors include the preparatory 
works and circumstances of conclusion of the treaty. 
77. See REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§§ 146-47, at 449-52 (1965) [hereinafter REsrATEMENT]. Section 147 lists nine interpre-
tive factors to be considered, but no priority of consideration is established. See also 
M. McDOUGAL, H. LAsWELL & J. MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND 
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1967). 
78. See, e.g., Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 51 (1929) ("Treaties are to be liberally 
construed so as to effect the apparent intention of the parties.''); Eck v. United Arab 
Airlines, 15 N.Y.2d 53, 59, 203 N.E.2d 640, 642, 255 N.Y.S.2d 249, 251 (1964) ("[I]t must 
be recognized that the literal wording of one particularly applicable section of the 
entire treaty should not set the limits of our interpretive examination.''). 
79. 3 PICTET COMMENTARY, supra note 6, at I. See also REsrATEMENT, supra note 77, 
§ 148(2), at 456. 
80. See generally Gutteridge, The Geneva Conventions of 1949, 26 BRITISH YEAR-
BOOK INTL. L. 294, 302-05 (1949). The elaborate dispute-settlement procedure created 
by the Conventions begins with consultations between belligerents through the good 
offices of the Protecting Powers. Field, Sea, and POW Conventions art. 8; Civilian 
Convention art. 12. Protecting powers are States instructed by another State to safe-
guard its interests and those of its nationals in relation to a third State. See 1 PICTET 
CoirMENTARY, supra note 6, at 86-103. In contrast to the provisions of the 1929 POW 
Convention, the Protecting Powers under the 1949 Conventions may consider matters 
of interpretation as well as application. Id. at 127. It is clear, however, that final 
interpretation of the Conventions is not entrusted to the Protecting Powers, but that 
they are allowed only to mediate differences arising with regard to interpretation. Id. 
at 129. Should consultations fail, an Enquiry Procedure to investigate the matter may 
be requested. The Enquiry Procedure is to be conducted in a manner agreed upon 
by the Parties. Field Convention art. 52; Sea Convention art. 53; POW Convention 
art. 132; Civilian Convention art. 149. Anticipating the possible failure of both con-
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Since the possibility that all the Parties to the Conventions would 
convene to settle a relatively minor interpretive problem is similarly 
remote,81 the most probable method of resolving such a controversy 
would be direct diplomatic consultations between the United States 
and the objecting Party. This conclusion corresponds with the tra-
ditional international procedure used to resolve treaty disputes.82 
Furthermore, direct consultations allow each Party to attempt to 
negotiate a result in accordance with its own theory of treaty inter-
pretation rather than to have imposed upon it a theory chosen by an 
adjudicative body. In such a dispute, it may at least be presumed that 
the United States would invoke the subjective theory of interpreta-
tion and press for a result consistent with that theory. Consequently, 
the following analysis will proceed under this theory and will at-
tempt to ascertain the intent of the Parties by examining all relevant 
interpretive factors. However, given the overlapping nature of in-
terpretive principles mentioned earlier,83 it seems evident that even 
if the objective theory were controlling, the interpretive process 
could encompass some factors outside any rigid hierarchy.84 
Before one engages in an analysis of the penal-sanctions provision, 
two further precepts of general application must be noted. As indi-
cated above,815 in interpreting the Conventions to determine whether 
their provisions protected the civilian victims at'My Lai, the under-
lying objective was to achieve the widest possible application of the 
Conventions' provisions-an objective supported by the purpose of 
the Conventions and the history of the laws of war, which the Con-
ventions in part codified. In ascertaining the scope of the obligations 
created by the penal-sanctions provision, however, the underlying 
objective is different; it is based on the understanding that the Ge-
neva Conventions were a compromise: "The goal was the highest 
degree of agreement possible . . . [ demanding] many compromises 
once the parties decided the cost of continued disagreement was too 
great considering the cost of ratification."86 It serves the humani-
sultation and enquiry, the 1949 Conference attempted to require referral of the dispute 
to the International Court of Justice. This attempt was rejected because the Conven-
tions are outside the United Nations system, of which the Court is a part. Instead, a 
Resolution was annexed to the Final Act of the Conventions recommending that Parties 
agree among themselves to refer otherwise insoluble disputes to the Court. 1 PICITET 
COMMENTARY, supra note 6, at 130-31. 
81. There were 128 Parties to the Conventions as of October 1970. 10 INTL. R.Ev. 
OF THE RED CROSS 557 (1970). 
82. See, e.g., REsTATEMENT, supra note 77, Explanatory Notes § 158, at 486-87. 
83. See note 73 supra and accompanying text. 
84. See, e.g., Proceedings, supra note 72, at 118, for an indication that the objective 
approach would not be a "straight jacket for the International Court of Justice." 
85. See te.xt accompanying note 47 supra. 
86. Smith, The Geneva Prisoner of War Convention: An Appraisal, 42 N.Y.U. L. 
R.Ev. 880, 905-06 (1967). The United States Senate apparently recognized the compro-
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tarian goals of the Conventions to interpret their provisions to afford 
protection to war victims in the maximum number of circumstances. 
An interpretation of these provisions, however, must also recognize 
the demands of state sovereignty as that concept operated in the 
formulation of the provisions under inquiry in light of the goal of 
attracting the maximum number of signatories willing to abide by 
the Conventions' terms. This focus requires that interpretive weight 
be given to the desire of each Party to retain, with minimum mod-
ification, those practices it followed prior to undertaking the obliga-
tions of the Convention.87 Finally, in interpreting the Conventions, 
the intention of the delegates to the 1949 Diplomatic Conference to 
leave unresolved issues open for future development, rather than to 
freeze the 1949 understanding of such matters into the Conventions, 
must be considered.88 Hence, in addition to all relevant factors under 
the subjective theory, the following analysis will incorporate the re-
quirements of state sovereignty and the desire of the draftsmen not 
to foreclose modification of the Conventions by future legal develop-
ments. 
B. The Conventions 
In an attempt to ascertain the extent of the obligation to prose-
cute violators of the Convention, the first interpretive factor for con-
sideration under the subjective theory is the ordinary meaning of 
the terms of the penal-sanctions provision itself. 89 This provision 
states that each Party "shall be under the obligation . . . to bring 
such persons [those who allegedly have committed, or have ordered 
to be committed, grave breaches] ... before its own courts."90 Al-
though the literal meaning of this phrase seems to establish an abso-
lute obligation to prosecute all accused persons, a result that would 
foreclose further inquiry under the objective theory, such literal 
meaning is not solely determinative under the subjective theory of 
interpretation applicable here.91 Beyond the explicit mandate to 
prosecute, this interpretive process would consider the context of the 
mise nature of the Conventions, for it avoided critical debate over controversial issues 
of interpretation to facilitate ratification. Id. at 888. 
87. It is clear, however, that despite the desire to give each Party the fullest 
opportunity to apply its own national laws in a given situation, adherence to the 
minimum standards of international justice must still be required. See notes 114 &: 
144 infra and accompanying text. 
88. See, e.g., G. DRAPER, supra note 32, at 21; 1 PICT.ET COMMENTARY, supra note 6, 
at 366. See also text accompanying note 204 infra. 
89. RE5rATEMENT, supra note 77, § 147(2), at 452. This factor is also the first cited 
under the objective theory. Vienna Convention art. 31. 
90. See note 16 supra. 
91. See Eck v. United Arab Airlines, 15 N.Y.2d 53, 59, 203 N.E.2d 640, 642, 255 
N.Y .S.2d 249, 251 (1964). 
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entire penal-sanctions article. The terms of this article include the 
POW Convention's guarantee of certain procedural safeguards to 
an accused prosecuted under its mandate.92 Such a guarantee might 
be pertinent to the grant of immunity at issue because the exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion is a practice traditionally considered to be 
a part of criminal procedure.93 The procedures set out by the article, 
however, are silent with regard to discretionary matters of prosecu-
tion. 94 Therefore, if any illuminating information is to be gained 
from the article, it must be found in its negotiating history. Un-
fortunately, that source of interpretive assistance is equally unavail-
ing. Prior drafts of the article make no reference to any matters com-
mitted to the discretion of the prosecuting Parties.95 The negotiating 
history does make clear that the article was intended to strengthen 
the obligation to enact legislation for the imposition of sanctions, 
and that the delegates to the Diplomatic Conference were deter-
mined to punish all violators.96 This determination to punish all vi-
olators must be considered in the context of the pre-1949 Conven-
tions and their provisions regarding penal sanctions. In these earlier 
conventions, mandatory punishment, if it existed at all, applied only 
to certain offenses.97 Thus, the emphasis on strengthening the re-
quirement to prosecute accused violators discernible in the history 
of the 1949 Conventions, when compared to the earlier, less com-
prehensive, obligation, need not suggest an absolute duty to prose-
cute. 
Because examination of the penal-sanctions article results in am-
biguity, other provisions of the Conventions that might by impli-
cation be helpful must be scrutinized. The only provisions in the 
Conventions that are similar to the penal-sanctions provision in that 
they deal with a deliberative process and decisions on findings from 
that process-which implicitly includes discretionary power to 
choose among different courses of action based on the findings-are 
those establishing the Conventions' dispute-settlement procedures.98 
Specifically, the provision most helpful in understanding the ap-
proach of the 1949 Conference to the exercise of discretionary power 
92. See note 16 supra. 
93. See text accompanying note 143 infra. 
94. The procedural rights under the Conventions are specified only in arts. 105-08 
of the POW' Convention. These include rights to notice, counsel, and appeal and 
humane conditions of imprisonment equal to that afforded nationals of the convicting 
Party. Negotiating history reveals that these safeguards were derived from those al-
ready established by arts. 60-67 of the 1929 POW Convention, and reflected no desire 
to make new law. l PICTET COMMENTARY, supra note 6, at 369. 
95. See generally 1 PICTET COMMENTARY, supra note 6, at 359-68. 
96. See text accompanying notes 15 & 56 supra. 
97. See note 12 supra. See also PICTET, supra note 29, at 470. 
98. See note 80 supra and accompanying text. 
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to prosecute is the article creating the Enquiry Procedure.00 The 
Enquiry Procedure, which is the second and final mandatory step in 
the dispute-resolution process provided by the Conventions, entails 
action on findings of fact and therefore might address discretionary 
practices connected with such action. However, neither the terms of 
the article nor its negotiating history makes any reference to alterna-
tive courses of action available once facts are found that constitute a 
violation of the Conventions; the Parties are simply required to 
suppress the violation without delay.100 Thus, it may reasonably be 
concluded that the Conventions do not speak, either in specific 
terms or in drafting history, to any matters of discretionary action. 
Consequently, the interpretive maxim expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius-expression at one place is exclusion elsewhere-cannot be 
employed to infer that prosecutorial discretion is precluded in the 
penal-sanctions article because such discretionary power is provided 
for elsewhere in the Conventions. 
Another source of guidance in interpreting the penal-sanctions 
provision is the actions taken by Parties subsequent to their ratifica-
tion of the Conventions, because such actions might reveal the in-
terpretations of the Parties relative to discretionary matters. Pur-
suant to the penal-sanctions article, Parties are required to enact 
legislation necessary to implement the terms of the article. These 
legislative actions likewise make no provision for the exercise of 
discretionary power.101 
Additional data to aid the subjective process of interpretation are 
the opinions of authoritative legal sources. Foremost in degree of 
authority, because of its special role in relation to the Conventions 
and the great esteem in which its opinions are held, are statements 
by the Red Cross.102 Commentary by this organization provides the 
first suggestion that the Conventions' obligation to punish may em-
body, sub silentio, some measure of discretionary power. As will be 
discussed later,103 one of the factors on which the discretionary power 
of the prosecutor may turn is the gravity of the offense, a factor 
which a Japanese prosecutor, for example, is legislatively authorized 
to consider in domestic cases. In 1949, the Red Cross, in an attempt 
to enhance the effectiveness of the supportive obligation to punish 
grave breaches, expressed a desire for the development of a model 
law for the repression of violations of the Conventions.104 The Red 
99. Id. 
100. 1 PICTET COIIIMENTARY, supra note 6, at 374-79. 
101. See especially the enactments of Great Britain, India, and the Soviet Union, 
supra note 57. For a summary of the legislative compliance of other Parties, see 3 
PICTET Co11i:MENTARY, supra note 6, at 621 n.I; Levie, supra note 68, at 455 n.90. 
102. See note 29 supra. 
103. See note 133 infra. 
104. 1 PICTET COIIWENTARY, supra note 6, at 363-64. 
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Cross recommended that the model law specify that the penalty for 
each infraction of the Conventions be in proportion to the gravity 
of the offense;105 this implies that each Party should permit its prose-
cutor to formulate a charge consistent with his determination of the 
gravity of the offense. Of more general import, however, are the 
views of the Red Cross regarding procedural matters in the aggre-
gate. At the Sixth International Congress of Penal Law, at which dis-
cussions of the model law suggested by the Red Cross took place, it 
was agreed that "the fixing of the sentence and the procedure to be 
followed are ... matters for national legislation in each country."106 
Sentencing is a clear example of the exercise of discretionary power 
in the administration of criminal justice.107 And, as mentioned ear-
Iier,108 prosecutorial discretion has been considered to fall within the 
generic term "procedure," which, according to the quoted statement, 
is committed to national legislation. Whether "procedure," in the 
sense of the 1949 Conventions, could be construed to include such 
prosecutorial discretion as the United States has exercised is un-
clear.100 
American legal thought may also be considered as an aid in the 
subjective process of interpretation. The late Secretary of State John 
Foster Dulles, in a letter written to solicit Senate support for the 
Conventions, stated that his support for the Conventions was based 
on the need for the United States to aid in the interpretation and 
enforcement of the Conventions, and the need to invoke them to 
protect United States citizens.11° This position implies an under-
standing that American practices, which have traditionally included 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion,111 are not precluded by the 
Conventions, but rather should be influential in interpreting the 
obligations imposed on the Parties. Such a conclusion is also a fur-
ther indication that national law should govern discretionary prac-
tices as a part of the "procedures" committed to national legis-
lation. In support of this general view favoring national control 
over procedures is a former Chief of the International Affairs Divi-
sion of the Judge Advocate General's office, who, although he does 
not specify prosecutorial discretion to be a part of such procedures, 
has stated that the procedural safeguards of the penal-sanctions 
article contemplate the application of national procedures with the 
limiting proviso that such procedures must not violate minimum 
105. Id. 
106. ll PICTET COMMENTARY, supra note 6, at 621 n.2. 
107. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 6 (1969). 
108. See note 9ll supra and accompanying text. 
109. See notes 115-43 infra and accompanying text. 
110. 1955 Senate Hearings, supra note 55, at 60-61. 
Ill. See notes 146-50 infra and accompanying text. 
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international standards.112 Finally, a former Legal Adviser of the 
United States Department of State has expressed the belief that a 
Party to the Conventions trying one of its own nationals for grave 
breaches, which would be the precise situation should Meadlo be 
brought to trial, would be governed only by its own national laws.113 
The American opinion on "national procedures" under the Con-
ventions is therefore consistent with that of the Red Cross and other 
multinational groups. 
Although these authoritative legal sources provide a consensus 
of opinion that procedural matters should be left to the national 
laws of the Parties,114 it is still not clear that the procedures were 
intended to include the discretionary power to withhold prosecution. 
To resolve such ambiguity, the fundamental principles of treaty in-
terpretation allow resort to the technique of "supplement[ing] the 
expressions of the parties by making reference to the basic consti-
tutive policies of the larger community which embraces ... [those 
parties ]."115 Therefore, if it can be shown that there was a wide de-
gree of international practice permitting the exercise of prosecu-
torial discretion in some form, it may be fairly assumed that such a 
practice was part of the background assumptions that the draftsmen 
brought to the 1949 Conference, at least with respect to the decision 
to allow leeway for future developments in the law. The existence 
of such a constitutive policy and the failure of the 1949 Diplomatic 
Conference to gainsay this policy would suggest that the practice of 
prosecutorial discretion was implicitly included in the aggregate of 
procedures customarily committed to national determination.116 
C. International Practice 
In ascertaining the nature and extent of discretionary enforce-
ment practices in the international community, two sources of in-
formation are important-those that deal with the subject on an 
112. Levie, supra note 68, at 454 n.86. See also notes 87 supra &: 114 infra. 
113. Yingling &: Ginnane, supra note 34, at 426 n.110. Prior to the American pro-
ceedings on the My Lai incident, it was generally believed that trials under the Con-
ventions would take place only when one belligerent had gained a decisive victory, 
and that the accused would presumably be citizens of the vanquished nation. G. 
DRAPER, supra note 32, at 23. But cf. Levie, supra note 68, at 461. It could therefore 
be argued that, regardless of the intentions of the Parties with regard to discretionary 
power in the normal prosecution contemplated, the problem of discretionary power 
in the present situation was simply not envisioned by the draftsmen. 
114. This view is in accord with the recognized rule of international law that the 
"regnlarity of a court's practice and procedure are to be judged in the first instance 
by the local law ••• [p]rovided the system of law conforms with reasonable principles 
of civilized justice and provided that it is fairly administered." 5 G. HACKWORTII, 
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 541 (1940). 
115. Proceedings supra note 72, at 113. See also M. McDOUGAL, H. LAswEu. &: J. 
MILLER, supra note 77, at 394-95; REsTATEMENT, supra note 77, § 148(l)(h), at 451. 
116. See notes 106, lUl &: 114 supra and accompanying text. 
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international basis and those that address the internal practice of 
nations. Inquiry into the first source must begin with consideration 
of those influential documents that purport to set forth standards 
for the protection of human rights to be followed by nations.117 In 
particular, reference must be made to the minimum judicial safe-
guards for civil and criminal procedures, which were devised for 
the protection of human rights, to determine if such safeguards 
include the regulation of prosecutorial discretion. These documents, 
however, are silent on the exercise of discretionary powers.118 So 
too are the provisions established to govern the procedures that 
were followed in the prosecution of war criminals after World War 
II,110 although the International Tribunal and signatory States were 
given the right to proceed against accused persons, and not the 
duty to do so, a provision indicating some latitude for discretionary 
decision-making.12° Commentators on international law, consistent 
with the conclusion of a leading legal scholar that there is "no 
systematic scholarly effort to penetrate discretionary justice,"121 
generally make no reference to the practice of prosecutorial discre-
tion in their discussions of procedure.122 Therefore, to determine if 
117. "The imposition of imperative international standards of ••• criminal court 
procedure is essentially a matter of protecting human rights .... The most elementary 
of human rights are those which constitute standards of procedural fairness and reg• 
ularity." Wise, Note on International Standards of Criminal Law and Administration, 
in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 135 (G. Mueller & E. Wise ed. 1965). 
118. The United Nations Charter makes at least seven references to human rights 
(U.N. CHARTER arts. 1(3), 13(I)(b), 55, 56, 62(2), 68 & 76(c)), but does not define those 
rights. Definitions are provided in The United Nations International Covenants on 
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A; 21 U.N. G.A.O.R. Supp. 16, at 49; U.N. Doc. A/ 
RES/2200 (X..XI) (Annex) (1966). The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights pt. III, 
art. 14 deals with criminal proceedings and with traditional procedural rights (e.g., 
fair trial, presumption of innocence, notice of charges, right to counsel). These do 
not address prosecutorial discretion. Of a more limited nature is the European Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 
221 (1955), European T.S. No. 5, which in § 1, arts. 5 & 6 deals with matters of 
criminal and civil procedure with even greater specificity, yet makes no mention of 
discretionary power. 
119. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals 
of the European Axis among the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544 [1945], E.A.S. No. 
472, 82 U.N.T.S. 280, provided for the punishment of German war criminals, while 
the Charter of the Agreement, Aug. 8, 1945, as amended Oct. 6, 1945, 59 Stat. 1546 
(1945), E.A.S. No. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 284 [hereinafter Nilrnberg Charter] set forth the 
rules of procedure to be followed by the International Tribunal established to try 
the accused. Art. 16 of the Nilrnberg Charter, which delineates those procedures, 
makes no reference to discretionary decision-making. 
120. Nilrnberg Charter, supra note 119, arts. 10 & 12. 
121. K. DAVIS, supra note 107, at v-vi. See also Dawson, International Law and the 
Procedural Rights of Aliens Before National Tribunals, 17 INTL. & COMP. L.Q. 404 
(1968); Grosman, The Role of the Prosecutor in Canada, 17 AM. J. CoMP.'L. 498, 500 
(1970). 
122. See, e.g., Orfield, What Constitutes Fair Criminal Procedure under Municipal 
and International Law, 12 U. Prrr. L. R.Ev. 35 (1950). Even in a recent treatment of 
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prosecutorial discretion represents a "basic constitutive policy" of 
the larger community, the practice of individual nations below the 
international level must be examined. Discretionary power is relied 
upon to a far greater extent in common-law countries than in Euro-
pean civil-law countries.123 Indeed, it has been noted that "nowhere 
is the contrast [between discretionary practices] greater than that 
between the American assumption that selective enforcement is 
necessary and the continental assumption that it is not."124 The use 
of prosecutorial discretion in the continental civil-law countries 
would lead one to suspect that the practice is a part of the criminal 
procedure of nations with less restrictive enforcement standards than 
the civil-law countries. The following sampling of the practices of 
nine nations representing three major legal systems supports the 
belief that prosecutorial discretion has in fact been a common prac-
tice. 
The concept that provides the marked contrast between the civil-
and common-law countries is the "legality principle." It is most 
strictly applied in the civil-law country of West Germany, where the 
statutory embodiment of the principle limits the prosecutor's free-
dom to refrain from initiating proceedings once he has evidence of 
criminal conduct.125 Yet, even in West Germany, deviation from 
the "legality principle" is permitted under the "principle of expedi-
ency."126 Likewise, in the civil-law countries of Sweden and Finland, 
similar exceptions to the prosecutor's legal duty to proceed are al-
lowed, particularly in the case of youthful offenders.127 Furthermore, 
although the discretion permitted German prosecutors may be very 
limited, German judges have some of the discretionary powers pos-
sessed by American prosecutors.128 This procedure corresponds to the 
traditional French civil-law practice in which the role of the prose-
cutor has been to recommend a just solution to the judge, who then 
makes the prosecutorial decisions.129 Like his German counterpart, 
intt:rnational procedural standards, which listed more than a dozen guarantees of pro• 
cedural justice commonly held to be required under international law, no mention 
was made of the exercise of discretionary power in prosecution. See Wise, supra note 
117, at 138. 
123. A. P.EKELIS, LAW AND SOCIAL ACTION 81 (1950). 
124. K. DAVIS, supra note 107, at 166. Selective enforcement is the ultimate form of 
prosecutorial discretion, for officials, who are clearly justified in enforcing the law, 
have the discretionary power to forgo any prosecution. Id. at 163. 
125. Jescheck, The Discretionary Powers of the Prosecuting Attorney in West Ger• 
many, 18 AM. J. Co.MP. L. 508, 509 (1970). 
126. Id. at 513-15. The expediency principle permits the prosecutor to refrain from 
prosecuting certain cases, such as those involving juvenile and petty offenses and 
political crimes. 
127. K.'DAVIS, supra note 107, at 192 n.4. 
128. Id. at 193. 
129. Vouin, The Role of the Prosecutor in French Criminal Trials, 18 AM. J. CoMP. 
L. 483, 492 (1970). 
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the French prosecutor has a limited area within which he may de-
cline to prosecute when he thinks it advisable to do so.130 Thus, it 
appears that even in those nations in which discretionary power is 
thought to be severely restricted, prosecutorial discretion has existed, 
either in prosecutors or in judges. Also of note is the fact that some 
civil-law countries deviate more widely from the legality principle 
than do West Germany and France. In Denmark and Norway, for 
example, prosecutors have a wide range of discretion to waive 
prosecution for less serious offenses.131 Japan, which operates under 
what has been termed a religious and traditional law system, 132 pro-
vides yet another illustration of decisional latitude allowed a prose-
cutor. In Japan, authority to determine whether to proceed against 
an accused, and in what form, has been vested in the prosecutor 
since the late nineteenth century; it was statutorily recognized as 
early as 1922.133 
The most pervasive use of discretionary power, however, is found 
in the common-law countries, where it is an established practice.134 
The common-law countries traditionally employ an accusatory sys-
tem in their administration of criminal justice, combining in the 
prosecutor the roles of accuser, investigator, and initiator of trial-
roles which the inquisitorial system of the civil-law countries keeps 
separate.135 Illustrative of the common-law practice is the observation 
that, in Canada, a major aspect of the prosecutor's role in the ad-
ministration of justice is his freedom to exercise wide-ranging dis-
cretion.136 In England there is prosecutorial discretion with respect 
to all crimes.137 
The foregoing sample of discretionary power in three major legal 
systems provides strong evidence of a uniformity of international 
practice sufficient to resolve the ambiguity surrounding the penal-
sanctions article of the Geneva Conventions.138 In light of the com-
mon practice of these countries to permit at least some measure of 
130. Id. at 488-89. See also Or.field, supra note 122, at 39. 
UH. See K. DAVIS, supra note 107, at 192 n.4. 
132. See R. DAVID &: J. BRIERLEY, MAJOR I.F.GAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY 384 
(1968). 
133. Dando, System of Discretionary Prosecution in Japan, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 
518 (1970). The 1922 Code authorized the prosecutor to consider such factors as "the 
character, age, and environment of the offender." Id. at 520. The 1948 Code added 
the factor of the gravity of the offense. Id. at 521. 
134. See text accompanying note 124 supra. 
135. See notes 125-30 supra and accompanying text. It is clear that this common-
law accusatory system is as legitimate under the standards of international law as the 
civil-law inquisitorial system. See 5 G. HACKWORTH, supra 114, at 541; Or.field, supra 
note 122, at 43. 
136. See Grosman, supra note 121, at 502. 
137. See Williams, Discretion in Prosecuting, 1956 CRIM, L. REv. 222. 
138. See note 115 supra and accompanying text. 
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discretion in prosecuting the criminally accused, the silence of the 
Geneva Conventions on such discretion may be interpreted in one 
of three ways. First, while discretionary practices apparently were 
permitted in a number of national procedures, articulation and 
analysis of prosecutorial discretion has only recently been initi-
ated.139 It is possible, then, that the draftsmen of the 1949 Conven-
tions either did not advert to prosecutorial discretion, or viewed it 
as so inherently a part of the administration of justice that they felt 
no need to give an explicit endorsement to the practice. Second, 
given the divergence of practice between the common-law and civil-
law countries, fundamental disagreement among the delegates con-
cerning what form discretion should take may have led to its omis-
sion from the Conventions altogether. Nevertheless, because of the 
critical goal of obtaining a maximum number of signatories to the 
Conventions140 and the number of national systems engaging in such 
discretionary practices, this omission could be read as a compromise 
to the principle of state sovereignty, impliedly allowing the practice 
according to each Party's national law. Finally, although the use of 
prosecutorial discretion in the international community may have 
been less extensive in 1949, the absence of a proscription of the prac-
tice may be indicative of the vision of the draftsmen in leaving the 
matter open for future development, as was done in at least one 
other provision.141 Such a position would be in keeping with appro-
priate canons of treaty interpretation142 and would recognize the 
validity under the Conventions of the present widespread exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion. 
The ambiguity of the extent of the Conventions' supportive obli-
gation to prosecute those accused of committing grave breaches is, 
under any of the three interpretations above, resolved in favor of 
recogonizing the intent of the Parties to allow the exercise of prose-
cutorial discretion. Furthermore, the practice of the states sampled 
above reveals that the discretionary practices are included in the 
procedures of criminal prosecutions. Such procedural matters are 
customarily left to national laws, also thought to be the appropriate 
method for establishing procedures required under the Conven-
tions.143 Therefore, to determine whether the United States' decision 
139. See notes 121 supra & 145 infra and accompanying text. 
140. See note 86 supra and accompanying text. 
141. The question whether a person could be handed over for trial to an inter• 
national penal tribunal was specifically left open by the delegates to the Diplomatic 
Conference so as not to hamper future developments in the law. G. DRAPER, supra 
note 32, at 21; 1 Pic:rET COMMENTARY, supra note 6, at 366. 
142. See, e.g., Larsen, Between Scylla and Charybdis in Treaty Interpretation, 63 
AM. J. !NTL. L. 108, 110 (1969) ("The most one can hope is that .•. lawyers can 
build an open-ended structure of law which will not restrict the desirable evolution 
of events, but give some shape and direction to them."). 
143. See notes 106, 113 & 114 supra and accompanying text. 
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to refrain from prosecuting a participant in the My Lai slayings vi-
olates the obligation imposed by the Conventions, it must be estab-
lished whether the grant of immunity violates United States' law. 
Additionally, consideration must be given to the dictates of inter-
national law, which place limitations even on matters left to the 
determination of individual nations in order to ensure that mini-
mum standards of justice and fairness are observed.144 
D. The Practice of the United States 
As was true with the international practice of prosecutorial dis-
cretion, scholarly materials dealing with the practice in the United 
States have been very limited until recently.145 In actual practice, 
prosecutorial discretion includes decisions over many activities in 
the administration of criminal justice, 146 but a decision not to prose-
cute stands as the most dramatic.147 The exercise of that discretion 
is one of the outstanding characteristics of the American legal sys-
tem. It is a power that has been consistently upheld in the office of 
the prosecutor.148 The reason for the widespread use of prosecutorial 
discretion in the United States, as in other common-law countries, is 
that full enforcement of the law has never been considered a tenable 
objective.149 Accordingly, American legal thought has supported 
the proposition that prosecution may be withheld in certain situa-
tions consistent with public interest, despite legal and factual cir-
cumstances sufficient to justify initiation of criminal proceedings.150 
144. See, e.g., United States (Way) v. Mexico, GEN. Cr.s. COMlllN., OPINIONS OF 
Com.ms. 94 (1929); United States (Chattin) v. Mexico, GEN. Cr.s. CoMMN., OPINIONS OF 
Cow.ms. 422 (1927). 
145. See, e.g., note 121 supra; Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discretion-A Comment, 
60 Nw. U. L. REv. 174, 175 (1965) ("[N]o serious study of the prosecutorial discretion 
has appeared in print within the past three decades). For two recent studies, see K. 
DAVIS, supra note 107; F. l\IILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION To CHARGE A SUSPECT 
WITH A CRIME (1970). 
146. Decisions subject to prosecutorial discretion include those to investigate, arrest, 
negotiate, or prosecute. K. DAVIS, supra note 107, at 6. 
147. Id. at 188. See also LaFave, The Prosecutor's Discretion in the United States, 
18 AM. J. COMP. L. 532 (1970); Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and Prosecutor's 
Discretion, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 64, 83 (1948). 
148. See, e.g., Pagach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), and cases 
cited in note 154 infra. See also MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 602 
(Tent. Draft No. I, 1966); F. MILLER, supra note 145, at IO. Within the federal govern-
ment, the prosecutorial function was centralized in the Department of Justice; by 
executive order this function included the discretionary power "to abandon prosecu-
tion." Schwarz, supra note 147, at 84. See also THE COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AND ADMINl>"'TRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 76 (1967) [herein-
after TASK FORCE REPORT]. 
149. F. MILLER, supra note 145, at 151. See also K. DAVIS, supra note 107, at 162; 
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 148, at 5-8. 
150. See, e.g., ABA ADVISORY COMM. PROJECT ON l\IINil\ruM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3.9(b), at 
92 (Tent. Draft 1970) [hereinafter ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT]. 
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The most insistent criticisms of the discretionary system focus on 
the absence of criteria to define those situations in which the public 
interest makes it appropriate to waive prosecution.151 As a result of 
such criticisms, principles have begun to emerge against which the 
validity of a grant of immunity can be measured. 
Formal norms designed to guide the prosecutor in the exercise 
of discretionary power are rarely found in statutes or judicial deci-
sions.152 Occasional statutes have required explanatory statements 
from prosecutors who decline to charge or who reduce an otherwise 
justifiably higher charge, but such statutes have not provided stan-
dards for these decisions.153 Judicial statements are equally unavail-
ing. The traditional view has been that "as an incident of the con-
stitutional separation of powers . . . courts are not to interfere with 
the free exercise of the discretionary powers of the attorneys of the 
United States in their control over criminal prosecutions,"154 al-
though the establishment of minimum requirements of good faith 
and a rational basis for dismissal has been urged.155 The standards 
that do exist have been suggested in the writings of commentators156 
and recently in the formal legitimation of certain discretionary 
practices by more influential legal sources.157 A widely recognized 
justification for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is the op-
portunity it provides to achieve other enforcement goals.158 Within 
that broad category of justification, the principle that an accused 
might be more valuable as a witness than as a defendant has been 
151. "The greatest and most frequent injustice occurs .•• [in discretionary decision• 
making] where rules and principles provide little or no guidance, where emotions of 
deciding officers may affect what they do, where political or other favoritism may in-
fluence decisions, and where the imperfections of human nature are reflected in the 
choices." IC DAVIS, supra note 107, at 4. 
152. F. MILLER, supra note 145, at 5. 
153. MICH. STAT . .ANN. § 29.981 (1954) (the prosecutor's reasons in fact and law for 
deciding not to charge must be stated); N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 342-a (McK.inneys 
1958) (the District Attorney must submit to the court his reasons for recommending 
the acceptance of a guilty plea for a lesser offense or punishment). 
154. United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 
(1965). See also Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Howell v. 
Brown, 85 F. Supp. 537, 540 (D. Neb. 1949). But cf. Berra v. United States, 351 U.S. 131, 
139-40 (1956) Gustice Black, dissenting) (liberty of citizens should not be placed in 
unreviewable discretion of one individual). 
155. United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 179 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 
(1965) Gudges Rives, Gewin & Bell, dissenting in part). 
156. For one of the earliest articulations of a general criterion, see Snyder, The 
District Attorney's Hardest Task, 30 J. AM. INST. OF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 167 (1939). 
Snyder suggests that the prosecutor should select only strategic cases in order to avoid 
adverse public opinion that he is persecuting so many cases rather than prosecuting 
the right ones. Id. at 173. 
157. See, e.g., ADVISORY COM?.ITITEE REPORT, supra note 150; TASK FORCE REPORT, 
supra note 148. 
158. See generally F. MILLER, supra note 145, ch. 17; LaFave, supra note 147, at 535. 
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established in practice,159 approved by a Presidential Commission,160 
and tentatively adopted by a committee of the American Bar As-
sociation.161 The reason generally given for inducing testimony by a 
waiver of prosecution is the desire to convict a more serious crimi-
nal,162 and in critical federal cases, top officials of the Justice De-
partment have normally assumed direct control from subordinates 
in the decision to waive prosecution.163 
In the trial of Lieutenant Calley, it was of paramount importance 
to the United States Government that the full measure of available 
evidence be a part of the deliberations and the ultimate decision, 
for this trial was the stage on which were re-enacted the actions of 
the United States military at My Lai; it was the setting in which 
all observers would judge the American legal process and its response 
to war crimes.164 The essentiality of ensuring the exhaustive and 
legitimate nature of the proceedings in view of the type of charges, 
the symbolic impact of the trial, and the position of the accused as 
the officer directly responsible for the assault on the village, needs 
no explication. The emphasis placed by the United States Govern-
ment on gathering the maximum amount of evidence165 and pro-
ceeding as far as that evidence warranted,166 while at the same time 
providing the fullest measure of procedual protections for the ac-
cused, 167 is illustrative of the significance attached to the Calley trial. 
The importance of securing Meadlo's testimony as one who, by his 
own admission, had fired upon South Vietnamese civilians under 
orders of the accused and had seen the accused do the same, is 
equally clear.168 Such circumstances traditionally have been consid-
159. Kaplan, supra note 145, at 187. 
160. TASK FORCE !lEPORT, supra note 148, at 4-6. 
161. See ADVISORY CoMMITIEE REPORT, supra note 150, § 3.9(b)(vii), at 92. 
162. See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 145, at 187. See also THE COMMISSION ON LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE 
SOCIETY 140 (1967). 
163. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 148, at 76; Kaplan, supra note 145, at 175. 
164. See, e.g., the comment of the Army prosecutor for the trial of Lieutenant 
Calley: "The trial of Lieutenant Calley was also in a very real sense the trial of the 
military judicial system." N.Y. Times, April 7, 1971, § I, at 12, col. I. See also notes 
165 &: I 76 infra. 
165. In gathering evidence the government investigating team heard over 400 wit-
nesses who delivered approximately 20,000 pages of testimony. N.Y. Times, March 30, 
1971, at 12, col. 1. See note 176 infra. 
166. See ¥.'bite Paper, supra note 48. 
167. For the special procedural protections afforded the accused, see the letter of 
the Army prosecutor, Capt. Aubrey M. Daniel, to President Nixon, in N.Y. Times 
April 7, 1971, § I, at 12, col. I, which cites as one special procedure the jury-selection 
method, which allowed the defense three peremptory challenges instead of the normal 
one. 
168. The Department of Justice has acknowledged that the purpose of granting 
immunity was to improve the chances of a successful prosecution of Lieutenant Calley. 
See Rehnquist Letter, supra note 54. Although the defense eventually admitted that 
1338 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 69:1312 
ered appropriate for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.169 Ad-
ditionally, the gTant of immunity was especially necessary because 
of Meadlo's adamant refusals to testify.17° Therefore, this decision 
not to prosecute an alleged war criminal does not, by American 
standards, constitute an unwarranted exercise of discretionary power. 
On the contrary, the reasons for withholding prosecution in this 
case fit squarely within the emerging principles that are thought to 
justify the exercise of such power. 
While the gTant of immunity is thus consistent with the "na-
tional procedures" of the United States, to meet the requirements of 
the Geneva Conventions the grant must also comport with the mini-
mum standards of international law. These standards provide no 
precise formula against which to measure a particular action, even 
when the practice involved is of a more structured nature than the 
practice at issue here.171 The paucity of articulated principles re-
lating to the exercise of discretionary power by national and inter-
national judicial systems makes it particularly difficult to elicit any 
clear guidelines for evaluating the gTant of immunity. The only 
compelling international criterion for judging the United States' 
action is the fundamental purpose of the penal-sanctions article 
itself: to sanction gTave breaches and to deter such breaches in a 
spirit of reprobation of war.172 For more than a century it has been 
this spirit that has periodically caused nations to agTee on means of 
regulating the conduct of armed conflict,173 and it is this spirit that 
must be the touchstone for determining whether the United States 
has fulfilled its obligations under the Conventions. Thus, as the 
achievement of other enforcement goals justifies the exercise of 
discretionary power in the American system,174 so under interna-
tional standards service to the spirit of the Conventions seems 
equally to justify the discretionary actions of a Party. The immuniza-
Calley ordered and participated in the execution of civilians at My Lai, this admission 
came after the granting of immunity to Meadlo. N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1971, at 10, 
col. 1. 
169. See notes 147, 155, 158-63 supra and accompanying text and note 170 infra and 
accompanying te.xt. 
170. Indeed, under the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, the only criterion 
for the grant of immunity is the refusal of a witness to testify on the basis of his 
fifth amendment privilege. Act of Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. II, § 20l(a), 
84 Stat. 927. 
171. What constitutes failure to comply with international standards of justice, 
however, has never been clearly established, but remains to be determined on a case-
by-case basis. "International tribunals have traditionally declined to lay down a com-
prehensive definition of 'denial of justice' just as the [United States] Supreme Court 
has declined to give a comprehensive definition of 'due process.'" \Vise, supra note 
117, at 138. 
172. Pictet, supra note 29, at 475. 
173. See notes 11 &: 12 supra. 
174. See note 158 supra and accompanying text. 
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tion of Meadlo cannot be isolated from the Government's awareness 
of the acute national and international interest in its conduct of 
military operations in South Vietnam, and especially its actions 
with regard to the war crimes committed at My Lai.175 The Govern-
ment's sensitivity to domestic and world opinion concerning the My 
Lai proceedings is amply demonstrated by the extraordinary lengths 
to which it has gone to investigate the incident and bring charges 
on the evidence so gathered.176 Further, the meticulous attention 
devoted to the proper conduct of the trial of Lieutenant Calley and 
the granting of immunity to Meadlo are outgrowths of the Govern-
ment's desire for a successful and unimpeachable prosecution of the 
Lieutenant, a desire fully in accord with the objective of the penal-
sanctions article. Even if the United States has violated the letter 
of the Conventions' obligation to prosecute those accused of grave 
breaches, the objective sought, the conviction of the most notorioll5 
of the accused under the fairest of circumstances, falls within the 
underlying spirit of the Conventions' dictate. Indeed, in this instance 
the failure to grant immunity could be said to be a violation of the 
treaty obligation to prosecute war criminals.177 Without an order of 
immunity to induce Meadlo's testimony, the prosecution would 
have been unable to marshal all critical evidence against Lieutenant 
Calley and thus arguably would have failed in its duty to ensure 
punishment of war criminals. 
The decision to forgo prosecution of Meadlo does not appear 
then, to contravene any minimum standard of international justice. 
It has further been demonstrated that the federal grant of immunity 
is consistent with national norms regulating the practice. These 
determinations are important because the Geneva Conventions them-
selves provide minimal guidance in defining the contours of the 
prosecutorial obligation. Rather, the Conventions envisioned that 
the scope of the obligation would be delimited in the national and 
175. President Nixon, in expressing United States policy in Vietnam shortly after 
the indictment of Lieutenant Calley and Meadlo's television interview, stated that we 
are fighting for the goal of keeping the South Vietnamese "from having imposed on 
them a government which has atrocity against civilians as one of its policies, and we 
cannot ever condone or use atrocities against civilians in order to accomplish that 
goal." N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1969, § 1, at 16, col. 1. 
176. The Government commissioned the Peers Panel, headed by United States 
Army Lieutenant General William Peers and composed of five other officers and two 
civilians, to investigate the inadequacy of the initial military inquiry into the My Lai 
incident. The result of this thorough effort was the indictment of twenty-five men 
under various articles of the UCMJ. Thirteen officers were charged with failure to 
investigate and report the incident. Twelve infantrymen, including Captain Ernest 
Medina, Company Commander of the force that assaulted My Lai, and his platoon 
leader, Lieutenant Calley, were charged with criminal violations. See generally N.Y. 
Times, March 17, 1970, at I, col. 2; id., March 18, 1970, at 1, col. 8. 
177. This position has been advanced by the Department of State. See Futterman 
Letter, supra note 54. 
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international regimes. In the present case, those regimes support the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion.178 
IV. LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE UNITED STATES POSITION 
Recognition of the justifications apparent in the American action 
suggests that a disputatious response would be unlikely. However, 
any strictly legal analysis will not be free from ambiguity because 
of the vagaries of treaty interpretation and the variance among 
nations in discretionary practices. Therefore, in order to achieve a 
more complete perspective on the legal consequences of the issuance 
of the immunity order, consideration must be given to the effects of 
a challenge to that order as a violation of the Conventions. 
At the outset, the distinction noted between the Conventions' 
direct and supportive obligations179 again is instructive. Certainly 
the most serious contentions may be raised by those South Vietna-
mese civilians who suffered personal and property losses from the 
American military action at My Lai; at their instigation, the Govern-
ment of South Vietnam might press a war claim on their behalf 
against the United States.180 If the Conventions should constitute 
grounds for such a war claim, the claim would be based on the viola-
tion of a direct obligation prohibiting grave breaches, and not on 
178. Despite his earlier statement to the press that the United States' grant of im• 
munity might have violated its obligation under the Conventions, Assistant Attorney 
General Rehnquist has subsequently espoused the view that "no violation of the Con• 
ventions took place." See Rehnquist Letter, supra note 54, and note 27 supra. 
179. See notes 50-53 supra and accompanying text. 
180. Such a procedure would represent what are traditionally called "war claims," 
types of conduct by which the liability of a nation is engaged under the broader 
rubric of the law of international claims. See, e.g., 5 G. HACKWORTH, supra note 114, 
at 471-851; M. WHITEMAN, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1943); RESTATEMENT, 
supra note 77, §§ 164-214, at 499-633. For an individual to avail himself of the process 
of an international claim he must request his government to press such a claim in 
his behalf, since the right under which he claims is the violation of an international 
legal interest of his government, not an individual personal right. 'Whether a govern-
ment will pursue its citizen's claim, either through informal negotiations or through 
more formal proceedings before some international tribunal, is normally a matter of 
national policy or law. See generally E. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECfION OF 
CITIZENS .ABROAD 355-98 (1915). Thus, there is no assurance South Vietnam would 
press such a claim for its injured citizens even though there may be a valid theory of 
liability under the "war claims" category of liability-producing conduct. That category 
provides for recovery of damages resulting from illegal acts of war falling outside 
the ambit of nonrecoverable losses resulting from "legal" acts of war ("war losses"). 
See generally 5 G. HACKWORTH, supra note 114, at 682-706; Hanna, Legal Liability for 
War Damage, 43 MICH. L. REv. 1057 (1945). The fact that a treaty codifies certain 
norms of conduct during war, as do the Geneva Conventions in their direct obliga-
tions, makes it easier to ascertain whether the United States military actions at My 
Lai fall outside the permissible boundaries of "war losses." 
The war claims mechanism has generally proved unsatisfactory. The terms have 
more often been imposed by the victors than by the rules of international law. See, 
e.g., w. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAw, CAsES AND :MATERIALS 795 (3d ed. 1971). See also 
note 113 supra. In the present case, the possibility of an amicable settlement would 
be greater because the parties are allies. 
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the supportive obligation to punish such breaches. However, it 
it also possible that an objection could be raised to the hypothetical 
violation by the United States of its supportive obligation to prose-
cute those accused of grave breaches. This objection could only be 
raised by Parties to the Geneva Conventions, since non-Party na-
tions would have no standing to object to the violation of a treaty 
to which they were not signatories. 
There are three sources of controversy within this limitation. The 
first such source, and the first Party that might conceivably object 
to the granting of immunity, would be the Government of South 
Vietnam, especially since under existing treaty obligations South 
Vietnam is unable to take direct action against the United States 
servicemen181 and therefore must rely upon the United States to 
redress its grievances. While South Vietnam would be the most ag-
grieved Party if the United States is in violation of its treaty obliga-
tion, it is highly improbable that the South Vietnamese Govern-
ment would object to the United States' decision regarding im-
munity. The South Vietnamese Government's primary concern 
would be directed to rectification of the breach of the Conventions' 
direct obligations, after which South Vietnam, as an American ally 
recognizing the lengths to which the United States has gone to fulfill 
its supportive obligations under the penal-sanctions provision, would 
probably be in accord with the United States' position.182 
The second source of objection to the failure to prosecute would 
be the Government of North Vietnam, which conceivably could 
take one of three courses of action. First, the North Vietnamese 
Government could assert that the failure to prosecute is a material 
breach of the Conventions and thereby claim the right to suspend 
the operation of the Conventions between itself and the United 
States. However, this possibility is remote for a number of reasons. 
To the extent that North Vietnam does not now consider itself 
bound by the Conventions with regard to captured American pi-
lots,183 such a claim would be an empty gesture. More importantly, 
the nature of the Conventions reveals that the legal doctrine that 
normally permits the unilateral suspension of treaty obligations 
181. United States servicemen have immunity from both the criminal and civil 
jurisdiction of the Government of South Vietnam under the Agreement for Mutual 
Defense Assistance in Indo-China among the United States, Cambodia, France, Laos, and 
Vietnam, Dec. 23, 1950, [1952] 2 U.S.T. 2757, T.I.A.S. No. 2447. Art. IV of the treaty 
provides that personnel assigned by one party to uphold the defense of another will 
be treated as "part of the diplomatic mission" of the party providing such assistance. 
182. The Department of State has expressed the view that the Government of 
South Vietnam recognizes the extensive efforts and good faith of the United States 
in its attempts to prosecute "those individuals who are within the reach of the mili-
tary courts," and would be unlikely to pursue any formal actions. See Futterm:;m 
Letter, supra note 54. 
183. See note 32 supra. The North Vietnamese do, however, regard themselves 
bound by the Conventions respecting other protected persons. 
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upon a material breach is inapplicable, since suspension of treaties 
for the protection of the human person is not permitted.184 Finally, 
the Conventions themselves make it clear that their obligations are 
not reciprocal in nature and that they cannot be suspended during 
the armed conflict.185 
The other nvo alternatives open to North Vietnam are available 
to the other Parties to the Conventions, the third potential source 
of objection to the grant of immunity. First, any of the Parties could 
invoke the dispute-settlement procedures established by the Con-
ventions. The controversy would probably end in negotiations, be-
cause only the first two steps of the dispute-settlement procedures 
(Conciliation and Enquiry) are mandatory and they provide for no 
binding resolutions. The third step, which would lead to a binding 
settlement by the International Court of Justice, is optional.186 
Second, should any of the Parties, including North Vietnam, con-
sider the procedures established by the Conventions unsatisfactory, 
such Party might bring a claim before the International Court of 
Justice without the consent of the United States.187 Either approach 
would be an appropriate method for attempting to invoke the juris-
diction of the International Court over the United States, although 
the unilateral claim would initially appear to have the better chance 
of success.188 However, even the unilateral claim would probably 
184. The most persuasive authority regarding the permissible actions of a party 
pursuant to a breach of a treaty is found in the Vienna Convention art. 60. Paragraph 
5 excludes from the aggrieved party's traditional power to suspend obligations those 
"provisions relating to the protection of the human person contained in treaties of a 
humanitarian character." 
185. See note 32 supra. Field Convention art. 63, Sea Convention art. 62, POW 
Convention art. 142, and Civilian Convention art. 158 provide that if a Party in-
volved in an armed conflict denounces the Convention, such denunciation shall not 
be effective until peace has been concluded. 
186. See note 80 supra. 
187. The Resolution to the Final Act of the Conventions recommends that Parties 
agree among themselves to resort to the International Court of Justice. See note 80 
supra. Absent American consent to this procedure, objecting Parties would have to 
rely upon the category of "breach of treaty" as the cause of action by which they 
might unilaterally attempt to invoke the jurisdiction of the International Court of 
Justice. See generally, REsTATEMENT, supra note 77, §§ 164-214. 
188. No nation is bound to appear before the International Court of Justice un-
less it should (a) consent to the Court's jurisdiction by treaty agreement with the 
nation seeking remedy against it (inapplicable here since the 1949 Conventions do not 
include such an agreement); (b) consent to the Court's jurisdiction by ad hoc agree• 
ment with ·the nation seeking remedy against it (as recommended by the Resolution 
to the Final Act of the Conventions, note 80 supra, but presumably inapplicable 
here since the United States would not likely agree to appear before the Court on 
the issue of the immunity grant); or (c) consent to the Court's jurisdiction through 
adherence to the "optional clause," art. 36, 1 2, Statute of the International Court 
of Justice. The "optional clause" provides that all nations that declare themselves 
to be bound to the jurisdiction of the Court shall be so bound without special agree• 
ment as against all other nations undertaking an equivalent obligation. Id. Thus, if 
the Party objecting to the American grant of immunity states a valid cause of action 
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be unsuccessful because the My Lai victims were South Vietnamese 
citizens, and any government other than that of South Vietnam 
would appear to lack the requisite legal interest in the subject mat-
ter of a claim contesting American failure to prosecute one allegedly 
responsible for the slayings. Other objecting Parties would lack 
standing to bring the claim before the Court.189 Finally, should the 
standing doctrine not defeat such a unilateral claim, the United 
States would still be able to resist the International Court's jurisdic-
tion by maintaining that the decision to immunize a citizen from 
prosecution is within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States. 
In adhering to the "optional clause" of the Statute of the Inter-
national Court of Justice,190 the United States specifically reserved 
from that Court's jurisdiction any dispute "within the domestic 
jurisdiction of the United States of America, as determined by the 
United States of America."191 
The United States Government exercised its discretionary power 
not to prosecute for valid reasons, in a decision consistent with its 
own standards and with international standards of justice and, 
therefore, consistent with its obligations under the Geneva Conven-
tions. That action is little susceptible to challenge, but should 
grounds for objection exist, the limited number of Parties in a posi-
tion to raise objection to a breach of the supportive obligation to 
prosecute have recourse only to dispute-settlement procedures that 
lack binding force absent the consent of the United States. Thus, the 
use of the prosecutor's discretionary power to refrain from proceed-
ing against a suspect has been accomplished in a war-crimes setting 
without significant legal consequence. The challenge now is to learn 
from that precedent. 
V. PROPOSALS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME 
A legal analysis can easily lose any urgent characteristic it might 
othenvise have when the subject of inquiry is the slaying of hun-
dreds of unarmed civilians. The analysis can be of consequence, 
before the Court, note 187 supra, and if that Party has assumed an "equivalent obliga-
tion" by declaring itself bound to the "optional clause,'' the United States would 
apparently be bound to appear before the Court to contest such a claim. This is so 
because the United States has declared itself, under the provisions of the "optional 
clause,'' to be bound to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of 
Justice. 61 Stat. 1218, 15 DEPT. OF STATE BuLL. 452 (1946). But see note 191 infra and 
accompanying text. 
189. See, e.g., the South West Africa Cases, [1962] I.C.J. REP. 319, [1966] I.C.J. 
REP. 6. 
190. See note 188 supra. 
191. 61 Stat. 1218, 15 DEPT. OF STATE BULL. 452-53 (1946). This proviso, known as 
the "self-judging" reservation or the "Connally Amendment," has been the subject 
of wide dispute. See, e.g., the nine articles presenting both sides of the question in 
46 A.B.A.J. 184-, 486, 729, 732, 737, 74-1, 74-4, 749 8: 851 (1960). 
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however, if joined with efforts to prevent the recurrence of such an 
atrocity. The contribution of the foregoing discussion in this re-
spect is to focus careful attention on the substance of the 1949 con-
ventions. The need for such attention is critical, for those humani-
tarian treaties require the Parties to communicate their dictates to 
the citizenry.129 It is evident that 
to be effective, the injunctions in the Geneva Conventions must be 
looked upon not as a jewel in a case, to be worn on gala occasions and 
the rest of the time locked up in a safe. Instead, for those who are 
called upon to observe them, they must become "everyday wear."193 
Although in several developing countries of Africa the Geneva Con-
ventions constitute a part of primary-school education,194 in the 
United States only military personnel receive instruction; and that 
was limited until recently to three hours of lessons on the POW 
Convention.195 The My Lai incident illustrates that it cannot be 
presumed that military personnel have such minimal need for edu-
cation on the rules of war; without thorough familiarity by those 
who must execute them, these rules will remain a dead letter.100 It 
is, therefore, not enough to conclude that the decision to grant im-
munity to Meadlo was not a violation of American obligations under 
the 1949 Conventions because such discretion is a legitimate device 
in American law enforcement. This would fail to recognize the 
central role of the Conventions and the need to explicate their man-
dates. Instead, emphasis must be placed on why that decision was 
proper within the context of the Conventions' obligation to punish 
192. See note 51 supra and accompanying text. 
193. 10 INTL. R.Ev. OF THE RED CROSS 366 (1970) (statement by Jean de Preux, Legal 
Adviser of the Red Cross). 
194. 7 INTL. REv. OF THE RED CRoss 70 (1967). 
195. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF THE .ARMY, PAMPHLET No. 20-151, CARE AND TREATMENT 
OF PRISONERS OF WAR (1958). Officers received two to six hours more instruction than 
enlisted men. 
196. See H. CoURSIER, supra note 10, at 2, Lieutenant Calley, as an infantry platoon 
leader, was responsible for ensuring compliance with the rules of war at the lowest 
and most critical level of tactical operations and thus should have had at least some 
grasp of the rudiments of those rules; yet he testified at his trial that he had never 
been instructed that he should refuse to obey an illegal order. TIME, April 12, 1971, 
at 16. Comments by other military officers likewise illustrate that military personnel 
are more concerned with the military commander's influence than with the Geneva 
Conventions. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, April 4, 1971, § 4, at 12, col. 6. The pervasive 
influence of command guidance in Vietnam places on commanders the duty of en• 
suring compliance with the Conventions, yet evidence indicates that that duty is not 
always performed. Army Lieutenant James Duffy, convicted by court-martial for 
ordering his sergeant to kill a deserting South Vietnamese soldier and to record him 
as a Viet Cong suspect, defended his order on the ground that platoon leaders never 
received guidance on the proper treatment of prisoners of war, but rather were told 
by commanders to increase their "body count." TIME, April 12, 1971, at 18. The em• 
phasis placed upon the "body count" in Vietnam suggests that the Conventions are 
in fact being tacitly violated by the encouragement of excessive zeal in combat. 
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and their purpose to protect war v1ct1ms. And, as a more formal 
communicative effort, the United States Government should take 
steps to initiate more explicit indoctrination on the rules of war for 
those persons responsible for controlling and conducting American 
combat operations, as the United States Army has apparently done 
since the My Lai incident.197 
An analysis of the international practice of prosecutorial dis-
cretion also has significance for the United States outside the con-
text of the punishment of war crimes. The United States is a party 
to various treaties in which the parties agree that certain conduct 
shall be punishable,198 and ratification of similar treaties in the fu-
ture seems probable.199 It is conceivable, therefore, that the United 
States may again be in a position to exercise discretionary power 
not to prosecute, as may other Parties to such treaties in situations 
in which the United States may have some interest. The essentially 
unstructured and unexamined practice of discretionary prosecution 
in many national legal systems, and the absence of treatment of this 
subject in international law, provides little assistance in determining 
how treaty provisions should address such possibilities or how Par-
ties should conform to obligations to punish. The dangers of un-
structured discretion have been noted;200 the consensus of Ameri-
can legal thought urges development of a system of controls to 
ensure rational and purposeful exercise of the power consistent with 
the public interest.201 There is no reason why there should not be a 
similar formulation of standards to control the practice in the inter-
national legal system, especially in light of the wide disparity among 
nations regarding the limits of prosecutorial discretion.202 Such a 
standardization, moreover, would be facilitated, and the problem of 
application solved, by the establishment of an International Crimi-
nal Court to administer justice consistent with established standards. 
The overarching interests present in any legal analysis concern-
197. See, e.g., My Lai Prompts New Training Film, Soldiers Get Vivid Lesson on 
Geneva Code, Los Angeles Times, April 26, 1971, at 1, col. 1; What the Army Is Doing 
To Prevent Another My Lai, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., April 12, 1971, at 24. 
198. See, e.g., 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas art. 15, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 
13/38 (April 29, 1958), which makes punishable the crime of piracy. 
199. See, e.g., The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 
adopted by the Hague Conference on December 16, 1970, 64 DEPT. STATE BULL. 35-36 
(1971). 
200. See note 151 supra. 
201. See, e.g., K. DAVIS, supra note 107, at 198 (full study of prosecuting power 
will lead to greater controls of discretion); TASK FORCE R.EPoRT, supra note 148, at 4 
(prosecutorial discretion should be subject to systematic factual determinations, pro• 
cedural regularity, and some type of judicial consideration of the decision). 
202. The original impetus for an International Criminal Court arose after the 
Niirnberg Trials of World War II. See generally Bridges, The Case for an Interna-
tional Court of Criminal Justice and the Formulation of International Criminal Law, 
13 INTL. & COMP. L.Q. 1255, 1269 (1964). 
1346 Michigan Law Review 
ing the My Lai incident necessarily are international in nature, and 
the interest in a treatment of prosecutorial discretion is no excep-
tion. Deterrence of war crimes is not a purely American concern, 
nor should investigations of allegations of atrocities rest in the hands 
of the government whose own forces allegedly committed those 
atrocities, no matter how objective that government may consider 
itself to be.203 The 1949 Diplomatic Conference expressly left open 
the possibility of the future development of an international penal 
tribunal.20"' The international investigation of atrocities in Vietnam 
that has been called for205 would require resort to such an inter-
national forum. The common interests of all nations would be 
served by the creation of a deliberative body less susceptible to na-
tional bias, with the power to impose on nations standards of con-
duct preservative of life in the face of armed conflict. In a minor 
yet illustrative way, the conclusions reached in this Comment sup-
port such a scheme. As the war-crimes trials of an earlier generation 
led to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the first proposals for an 
international tribunal to adjudicate international crimes, perhaps 
the My Lai incident and the response of the American legal system 
to it will prompt further humanitarian developments as the civilized 
world attempts to reduce the loss of life on whatever future battle-
field the political mind of man finds necessary to its ambition. 
203. See generally, Comment, My Lai Massacre: The Need for an International 
Investigation, 58 CALIF. L. REv. 703 (1970). The clearest example of the inability of 
the United States Government to allow the legal process to operate without being 
influenced by extralegal factors is the intervention of President Nixon subsequent to 
the conviction and sentencing of Lieutenant Calley. In apparent response to public 
dissatisfaction with the verdict, President Nixon released Calley from confinement 
pending the outcome of the appellate process and later publicly stated his decision 
to review the case personally before the sentence was carried out. N.Y. Times, April 2, 
1971, § I, at 1, col. 8; id., April 4, 1971, § 1, at 1, col. 8. Criticism from the foreign 
press was immediate and nearly unanimous in charging that popular appeal had taken 
precedence over due process of law and that the President's intervention had violated 
the independence of the judiciary. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, April 6, 1971, § 1, at 18, col. 5. 
Another suggestion of the lack of objectivity lies in the investigative response to My 
Lai. The Peers Panel, supra note 176, had as a member Colonel Joseph R. Franklin. 
In a separate action, United States Army Lieutenant Colonel Anthony B. Herbert is 
drafting charges that Colonel Franklin himself is guilty of covering up war crimes 
perpetrated by the brigade Colonel Franklin commanded in Vietnam. TIME, March 22, 
1971, at 16. Furthermore, of twenty-one servicemen other than Lieutenant Calley 
convicted of premeditated murder in Vietnam, all were originally sentenced to life 
imprisonment, and all sentences were reduced on military appeal; most now stand at 
five to ten years. N.Y. Times, April 13, 1971, § 1, at 8, col. 1. There is evidence then 
that the military system is not capable of handling objectively the investigation and 
punishment of alleged war crimes in Vietnam without the interference of influences 
that derogate from the demands of the rule of law. It is submitted that a supranational 
tribunal such as an International Criminal Court would be the only acceptable alter-
native to what is now at best a national embarrassment. 
204. See note 141 supra. 
205. See notes 63 &: 203 supra. 
